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FOREWORD
Africa today has emerged as a continent of strategic consequence. Domestic and international terrorism
aside, the two great powers of our time, the United
States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are
vying for influence over African governments and
people. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of
exerting influence in Africa is through the use of nonviolent instruments of grand strategy.
In this monograph, Dr. Donovan Chau considers one
nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular,
political warfare. Retracing the origins and mischaracterizations of political warfare, Dr. Chau suggests that
the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand
strategic instrument in Africa. The monograph offers a
concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa. It then examines PRC
political warfare operations in four regional “anchor”
states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.
What emerges from Dr. Chau’s analyses is the Chinese use of political warfare intentionally targeting
U.S. interests in Africa. Unless the U.S. Government
recognizes the utility of political warfare and reorients
the federal bureaucracy to employ it effectively, he intimates that future U.S. influence in Africa will wane—
to the benefit of a country that understands political
warfare and uses it seriously.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Today, as in the past, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exerts influence on the African continent.
Unlike the United States, which also attempts to sway
African nations and people, the PRC uses an instrument of grand strategy called political warfare as its
primary means of influence. What is political warfare,
and how is it being employed in Africa today? How
do U.S. capabilities compare to PRC operations and
capabilities in Africa? The monograph answers these
and other questions to inform the current national security debate among U.S. policy and decisionmakers.
For while the struggle against international terrorism
will continue indefinitely, the U.S. Government must
not overlook other grand strategic challenges currently
taking place around the world.
The monograph explains political warfare in its
historic context and offers a current definition. Simply,
political warfare is a nonviolent instrument of grand
strategy, involves coordinated activities, and results
in tangible effects on intended targets. In operational
terms, political warfare includes economic aid and development assistance, as well as training, equipping,
and arming military and security forces. Exchange visits and public pronouncements are secondary political
warfare operations, supporting and facilitating primary operations. Political warfare offers distinct advantages to other instruments of grand strategy, making it
a desirable means of exerting influence. Vis-à-vis other
instruments—particularly military power—political
warfare is economical. Though results may not appear
immediately, using political warfare has grand strategic benefits, from information-gathering to relation-



ship-building. Moreover, political warfare may potentially garner prestige and a positive reputation around
the world.
The U.S. Government possesses numerous political
warfare capabilities, though they may not be viewed as
such. From the U.S. Army and other armed services to
the State Department and the Agency for International
Development, U.S. capabilities exist but are not being
used to their full potential or in a coordinated manner.
Meanwhile, another country is intentionally targeting
U.S. policy in Africa through the use of political warfare.
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are considered regional “anchor” states according to U.S. national security policy. Since 2000, the PRC has expanded political warfare operations in these four countries.
The monograph examines PRC political warfare operations in each country.
•

The first case highlights how the PRC used political warfare to gain access to and develop opportunities in Ethiopia. Using donations to the
Ethiopian government and people as well as to
the African Union (and its predecessor), Beijing
attained government contracts, signed agreements, and cultivated bilateral relations.

•

The PRC used political warfare to move relations with Kenya to a higher level. PRC operations expanded China’s reach into the information, education, and infrastructure development
areas of Kenya.

•

PRC operations were diverse and directed at
influencing the people and government of Nigeria, particularly state governments. PRC political warfare operations affected all aspects of
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Nigerian society, furthering PRC interests in
the country.
•

Gaining South Africa’s allegiance had the benefit of weakening Taiwan’s global diplomatic
status, which was part and parcel of the primary objective of Chinese grand strategy. PRC
operations in South Africa were used to attain
cooperation in technical and scientific fields.

Comparing PRC operations and U.S. capabilities,
the monograph underscores the lack of political warfare in America’s current grand strategy. Educating
and deploying the U.S. military to conduct political
warfare in Africa is an immediate, short-term solution.
In the long term, however, a civilian U.S. Government
agency must lead the political warfare charge abroad.
This will require political leadership as well as prudent
policy. Most importantly, national security policy and
decisionmakers must come to the realization that how
operations are conducted is as important as what operations are performed
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POLITICAL WARFARE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
U.S. CAPABILITIES AND CHINESE
OPERATIONS IN ETHIOPIA, KENYA,
NIGERIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA
Introduction.
In October 2005, U.S. Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion THREE began rebuilding and constructing water wells in Ethiopia. “Being in a place like this
where water is so hard to come by and knowing we’re
giving people water who’ve never had water before
. . . this is a really rewarding mission to be on,” said
Steel Worker Third Class Jared M. Perry.1 That same
month, U.S. troops on patrol nearby discovered two
cheetah cubs tied up with ropes around their necks at
a restaurant, where the cubs were forced to fight each
other for the amusement of patrons and village children. The soldiers alerted the Ethiopian government,
the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, and a U.S.-based cheetah
rescue organization, eventually flying the two cubs to
the National Palace in Addis Ababa. “This is the first
kind of rescue of animals, let alone cheetahs, that we
have done,” said Army Sgt. Leah Cobble.2 The following month, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs team held a 3-day
clinic to treat the sick from six villages surrounding
Gode, Ethiopia. “We treated everything from minor
injuries such as cuts to severe long-term injuries,” said
Army Staff Sgt. John Dominguez, a civil affairs medic.3
Meanwhile, about the same time west across the
African continent, it was reported that the People’s Republic of China (the PRC or Beijing) would help Nigeria
drill 598 boreholes in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, as well



as 18 states—all as a free aid project. The free water
supply project was “aimed at providing clean drinkable water to ordinary Nigerians living in out-of-theway areas,” said PRC Ambassador to Nigeria Wang
Yongqiu.4 Nigerian Minister of Water Resources Alhaji
Muktar Shagari later remarked, the project “is a typical
example of bilateral cooperation” between Nigeria and
the PRC, and appealed to other countries to “learn from
China.”5 Also in October 2005, it was reported that Beijing donated $3 million worth of military equipment to
Nigeria. The equipment included “two special vehicles,
emergency runway systems, bullet proof helmets and
vests, communication gadgets, computers, uniforms
and diving devices.”6 Ambassador to Nigeria Wang
later mentioned that 21 Chinese “experts” would arrive in Nigeria in November to train Nigerian soldiers
on how to use the equipment.7
What do these actions by the United States and PRC
governments mean, and why are they relevant today?
These events in two strategically-located countries
in East and West Africa are examples of governmental efforts to conduct an instrument of grand strategy
called political warfare.8 Both the United States and the
PRC were using nonviolent means in a coordinated (or
semi-coordinated) manner to directly affect the targeted population. They were using political warfare to
achieve their national objectives. But what is political
warfare, and why is this instrument of grand strategy
being used by two of the world’s dominant powers on
the African continent today?
Political Warfare: What It Was and What It Is.
The term political warfare was first used by the
British during World War II.9 During the war, the
British established the Political Warfare Executive to


help defeat Nazi Germany. The Executive’s primary
mission was the creation and dissemination of propaganda, particularly beyond enemy lines.10 In modern
parlance, the British have continued to define political warfare as “overt and covert forms of information
management.”11 At the conclusion of the war, the British government disbanded the Political Warfare Executive—the term and concept falling into disuse.
Across the Atlantic Ocean after the war, George
Kennan, head of the newly established State Department Policy Planning Staff, attempted to invigorate
the post-war U.S. Government with a paper concerning “the inauguration of organized political warfare.”12
Although his attempt to codify political warfare into
the U.S. national security establishment ultimately
failed, Kennan offers a sound basis from which to define political warfare and understand its utility to the
United States.13 In his State Department Policy Planning Staff memorandum, Kennan drew on the British
experience in World War II to define political warfare.
“In broadest definition,” Kennan wrote, “political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s
command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”14 Kennan made a distinction between overt and
covert “types” of political warfare. Moreover, he considered overt operations “the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership,
whether or not they are recognized as political warfare.”15 Unlike any American policymakers before him,
Kennan advocated the use of this instrument of grand
strategy.
From Kennan’s memorandum, three significant
concepts relevant to a sound definition of political warfare may be deduced. First, political warfare, according
to Kennan, was an instrument of grand strategy that
involved all the means of a nation-state, short of war.


While broadly applicable, this concept implies the utility of all nonviolent instruments of grand strategy, as
well as the utility of coordinating them together. Second, Kennan’s definition of political warfare states explicitly that this instrument is used to achieve national
objectives. This concept may appear self-evident—being an instrument of grand strategy—but it is crucial
to understanding political warfare’s ultimate aim. Finally, Kennan mentions in passing the importance of
“positive leadership” in a foreign office’s “traditional”
policy activities. He may have been simply suggesting
the importance of leadership in foreign affairs. At the
same time, one may interpret “positive leadership” to
mean the ability to connect means—as whole—to ends,
which is political warfare at its best.
A clear, concise, and contemporary definition of
political warfare is needed—for this study and for U.S.
national security today. Based on past definitions and
uses, political warfare is an instrument of grand strategy. The purpose of political warfare is determined by
an actor’s objectives—its intent. Any actor with the capabilities and intentions may employ political warfare
as an instrument of grand strategy. And the use of political warfare is not confined by an actor’s specific culture. Used by state or nonstate actors, political warfare
targets groups and individuals.16 Overt or covert, it is
a nonviolent instrument of grand strategy comprising
interrelated activities that are tangible (or, at least, audible or legible).17 Therefore, the mind and the body
are both targets; and political warfare operations often
have a direct effect on peoples’ lives. Therefore, operations include targeted economic aid, development projects, exchange visits, and public pronouncements, as
well as the training, arming, and equipping of military
or security forces.18 While nonviolent, political warfare



operations may sometimes support or result in violent
activities. In order to be effective, political warfare operations must be based on detailed, factual information about the targeted group, including knowledge of
peoples and cultures.19
To summarize, political warfare is a nonviolent
instrument of grand strategy, involves coordinated
activities, and results in tangible effects on intended
targets.20 Primary political warfare operations include
economic aid; development assistance; and training,
equipping, and arming military and security forces.
Exchange visits and public pronouncements are secondary political warfare operations because they support and facilitate primary operations. Political warfare
offers distinct advantages over other instruments of
grand strategy. Vis-à-vis other instruments—particularly military power—political warfare is economical;
it does not require a vast amount of financial resources and, thus, may be readily used around the world.
Though results may not appear immediately, using
political warfare has grand strategic benefits, from information gathering (to understand different peoples
and cultures) to relationship building (to prevent future conflict). Political warfare, if used appropriately,
may potentially result in much-needed prestige and a
positive reputation around the world, which is difficult to gain and even more difficult to preserve.21 These
benefits help explain why political warfare is currently
being used by the United States and the PRC in Africa,
and why understanding it is vital for the U.S. military,
policymakers, and Congress.
Monograph Scope.
This monograph examines Beijing’s use of political
warfare on the African continent.22 The central ques

tion asks: to what extent has the PRC achieved the central objective of its grand strategy in Africa. The PRC
is examined because of today’s lack of sound grand
strategic analyses of Beijing’s actions, particularly in
Africa. Since early 2004, attention has been paid to
the PRC’s involvement in Africa. While some analysts
have focused narrowly on PRC interests in raw materials (hydrocarbons, in particular), others have recognized Beijing’s broader interests on the continent.23
As in the past, the PRC has continued to emphasize its
historic ties, shared common experiences, and peaceful
cooperative relations with African nations.24 Also as in
the past, however, Western assessments of PRC operations in Africa have been flawed. U.S. intelligence analysts, policymakers, and senior diplomats have cited
Beijing’s recent “increased” interest and engagement
in the region and identified its objective of attaining
status as a “major player” on the world stage.25 However, their commentaries have demonstrated a general
lack of knowledge and understanding pertaining to the
PRC’s grand strategy. This monograph will provide a
current assessment of PRC actions in Africa based on
recent historical evidence and an understanding of an
essential instrument of PRC grand strategy, political
warfare.
Because Beijing is currently operating (or has operated) in nearly every country on the African continent,
it is beyond the scope of this monograph to examine all
of its operations in detail. Instead, Beijing’s use of political warfare will be highlighted in four sub-Saharan
African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South
Africa. These countries were chosen due to their importance to U.S. policy in Africa. As the 2002 National Security Strategy stated, “[C]ountries with major impact
on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria,



Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention. . . .”26 Based on
historical relations, the United States has maintained
close ties with these countries. Examining the PRC’s
operations in these four African “anchor” states will
reveal the extent to which it has intentionally targeted
U.S. Africa policy in addition to furthering its grand
strategic objectives. While it will be necessary to draw
from historical bilateral relations, the focus of this selective study will be on Beijing’s 21st century political
warfare operations in the four African anchor states—
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.27
In addition to examining Beijing’s use of political
warfare in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa,
the monograph will provide an overview of U.S. political warfare capabilities in Africa. This overview will
serve as a comparative reference point vis-à-vis PRC
operations and will enlighten analysts, policymakers,
and diplomats on some of the political warfare capabilities of the U.S. Government. Therefore, with a focus
on the four anchor states, U.S. political warfare capabilities will be highlighted before examining the PRC’s
central objective and its operations. The concluding
chapter will answer the central research question,
compare the PRC’s capabilities with U.S. capabilities,
and offer policy recommendations to the U.S. Army,
Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. national
security establishment.
U.S. Political Warfare Capabilities in Africa:
An Initial Assessment.
This section provides an overview of U.S. political
warfare capabilities on the African continent.28 The focus is on U.S. Government organizations and agencies



that have the ability to provide economic aid and development assistance, as well as to train, equip, and
arm military and security forces. Secondarily, organizations and agencies that conduct exchange visits
and make public pronouncements will be mentioned
as they pertain to supporting political warfare operations. U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
with political warfare capabilities will be included in
this overview as well. When assessing U.S. political
warfare capabilities, it is necessary to discuss the agency or organization’s missions and roles, in addition to
providing concrete examples of operations. The breakdown of U.S. political warfare capabilities necessarily
varies by context—dependent on the country and the
requirements of U.S. foreign policy, as well as the purpose and functions of the organizations. Moreover, it is
crucial to bear in mind the various competing interests
among U.S. Government organizations and agencies in
each country.29 It will become evident that the United
States possesses a robust (but latent) political warfare
capability across the African continent.
The U.S. military possesses many political warfare
capabilities, though they may not be viewed as such.
The U.S. military conducts primary and secondary political warfare operations. It conducts operations on
the African continent through three combatant commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).30 Directed by the President through
the Secretary of Defense, the authority and resources
to conduct political warfare lie in the hands of the combatant commanders (COCOMs). COCOMs oversee
and coordinate overall operations within their areas of
responsibilities.
The U.S. Army has a wide range of political warfare
capabilities that have been used in Africa. At the fore

front of these capabilities in Africa is the 3rd Special
Forces Group, U.S. Army Special Forces Command.
Special Forces’ political warfare capabilities include
Foreign Internal Defense, as well as collateral activities such as humanitarian assistance and de-mining. In
2000, for example, 3rd Special Forces Group trained two
Nigerian battalions in peacekeeping duties for United
Nations (UN) initiatives in West Africa—Sierra Leone,
in particular. Nigeria was also given $42 million in
military hardware, including rifles, mortars, machine
guns and ammunition, as well as vehicles and medical
and communications gear.31 Another element of Army
Special Operations Command that conducts political
warfare in Africa is the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion,
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command. Working with civil authorities and civilian
populations, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion conducts
a multitude of political warfare missions from locating civil resources to support military operations to
establishing and maintaining liaison with civilian aid
agencies and civilian commercial and private organizations.32 Together, 3rd Special Forces Group and the
96th Civil Affairs Battalion represent the most active
and versatile political warfare capabilities within the
Army.
The Army also possesses unique political warfare
capabilities outside of the Special Forces community.
Within U.S. Army Europe/Seventh Army, EUCOM’s
Army resources, support elements, and medical professionals—such as the 30th Medical Brigade—have
conducted political warfare operations in Africa. In
2002, a team of U.S. soldiers (including a civil affairs
unit and professionals from the 30th Medical Brigade)
helped destroy and dispose of thousands of unexploded ordnance pieces in Nigeria.33 In addition to theater



resources, the Army possesses a range of multi-mission
forces that have the ability to conduct political warfare
in Africa. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has valuable construction capabilities that could be leveraged
across Africa. The Army’s Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) also provides
a wide spectrum of training and technical assistance
that falls within the realm of political warfare. Though
widely unrecognized, SATMO has deployed security
assistance teams to all four anchor states in Africa over
the past 20 years.34
The Army Reserve and State National Guards
play significant political warfare roles in Africa. For
example, in September 2004, military equipment and
personnel from the New York Air National Guard
participated in a South African air show. The New
York National Guard is partnered with South Africa
through the State Partnership Program (SPP), a reserve
component initiative that aligns U.S.-based Guard and
Reserve units with militaries of other nations “to enhance professional relationships and mutual understanding amongst the participating nations.”35 Established by the National Guard Bureau in 1993, the SPP
fosters economic, political, and military ties between
U.S. states and partner nations. It does so using a threetiered approach to build military-to-military, militaryto-civil, and civil-to-civil relations. This simultaneous
approach is designed to evolve from strictly military
relations to robust civilian interactions.36 By building
relationships in an all-around fashion, the SPP is one
of the U.S. Government’s key political warfare mechanisms.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps also have demonstrated political warfare capabilities in Africa. U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Sixth Fleet has long been active
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along the Atlantic Ocean seaboard of the African continent. Since 1978, the Sixth Fleet has deployed ships on
regularly scheduled West African training missions. In
2005, for example, the USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) participated in a Gulf of Guinea deployment. “The purpose of the deployment is to enhance security cooperation between the U.S. and participating Gulf of Guinea
nations by providing the opportunity to interact and
improve familiarization with how we operate in realworld environments,” said Vice Adm. Harry Ulrich,
Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet.37 The U.S. Naval Construction Force—popularly known as the Seabees—is
another political warfare capability within the U.S.
Navy. For example, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion THREE and Underwater Construction Team ONE
completed the Manda Bay boat ramp project in March
2006, which allowed the Kenyan Navy smoother access to patrols along coastal and international waters.
“The Kenyan Navy and surrounding communities will
benefit greatly from this ramp,” said Major General P.
O. Awitta, commander of the Kenyan Navy. “We’re
very thankful to the coalition for helping us complete
this important project, which will enhance our training
and capabilities in the region.”38 Marine Corps Special
Operations Command (MARSOC) was established in
2006, adding nearly 2,600 personnel to U.S. Special
Operations Command’s total end strength. Like Army
Special Forces, MARSOC possesses a valuable political warfare capability in its Foreign Military Training
Unit.39
The U.S. Air Force also possesses political warfare capabilities. With responsibility for Sub-Saharan
Africa, U.S. Air Forces in Europe has sent personnel
and equipment to Africa. In 2004, for example, over
500 U.S. and South African military doctors, dentists,
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technicians, and support personnel participated in a
military medical exercise known as MEDFLAG. Initiated in 1987 between EUCOM and various African
nations, MEDFLAG exercises offer the chance to conduct health care and disaster relief training and to provide rare medical and dental care to the local African
populations.40 Like the Army, the Air Force possesses
a range of political warfare capabilities within its support units.
Finally, various multi-service components of the
U.S. military possess political warfare capabilities.
Some of these components—like Special Operations
Command Europe—have overlapping resources and
capabilities within the services. Others, like Combined
Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), are
semi-autonomous entities that draw from the various
services and COCOMs to conduct political warfare activities. Established in June 2002, CJTF-HOA is unique
among U.S. military political warfare capabilities because of its stated post-September 11, 2001, mission:
“to wage peace across the region, to deny the enemy
a safe haven, to increase the capacity of host nations
to provide services for their people and combat terrorism.”41
Outside of the U.S. military, a civilian political warfare organization within the U.S. Government is the Department of State. U.S. embassies represent sovereign
U.S. territory abroad. In the four sub-Saharan African
nations examined in this monograph, this is certainly
the case. U.S. embassies represent U.S. policy as directed by the White House through the Chief of Mission.
Operating on annual timelines, political warfare capabilities of U.S. embassies vary from country to country.
For example, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
dispersed grants “to expand classrooms in Amhara, to
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purchase and install a grinding mill in Gambella, to
construct antenatal, delivery, and postnatal wards at
a health center in Oromiya, and to discourage female
genital cutting in the Somali region,” while U.S. Embassy Abuja, Nigeria, “provided a collection of books,
CD-ROMs, and magazines on American history, literature, education, culture and law, as well as educational
advising materials” as part of the “American Corner
Kaduna.”42 The State Department also provides foreign
assistance through various funding mechanisms such
as International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR). The programs and initiatives from these mechanisms provide
various forms of training, equipment, and technical
assistance, which may be categorized as political warfare.43
In contrast to its foreign offices, the State Department has offices in Washington, DC, that perform political warfare as well. These include the Office of the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which is charged with formulating a policy for
representing the United States abroad. Two organizations that directly support this effort are the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the
Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP).
ECA’s mission is to foster “mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people
of other countries around the world,” while IIP “informs, engages, and influences international audiences
about U.S. policy and society to advance America’s interests.”44 More recently, the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established in
2004 to work “across the U.S. Government and with
the world community to anticipate state failure, avert it
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when possible, and help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development.”45 In some respects, this office was
intended to act as a coordinator of political warfare
operations. The State Department, while ideally positioned within the federal bureaucracy to lead and coordinate such activities, conducts mostly secondary—or
supporting—political warfare operations.46
The U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID) is the leading non-military political warfare organization within the U.S. Government. Established in
1962, AID has provided disaster assistance aid, helped
alleviate poverty, and engaged in global democratic reforms. AID’s focus has evolved—from a “basic needs”
approach in the 1970s to “stabilization and restructuring” in the 1980s to greater attention on failing states
now and greater responsibility for developing nations
(e.g., through the Millennium Challenge Account,
MCA, and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief, PEPFAR).47 Throughout its history, AID’s field
offices (or missions) have represented the strength of
this political warfare organization. Like U.S. embassies,
the priorities of AID field offices vary from country to
country. For example, the mission in Kenya focuses
on goals such as “raising the living standards of the
poor,” “helping to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS,”
and “fostering better management of Kenya’s natural
resources.”48 The mission in South Africa, on the other
hand, identified sustainable “transformation” as the
office’s overall goal.49 Field offices formulate multiyear (often 4 years) strategic plans based on in-depth,
in-country research and analysis. In this manner, AID
shares similar qualities with the military; both are interested in the realities on the ground. By the same token, AID and the military can be considered “do-ers”;
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rather than being response driven, both organizations
focus much of their attention on prevention.50 In October 2005, the similarities between these organizations
led to the establishment of the Office of Military Affairs within AID. Based in Washington, DC, this office
is intended to function as a focal point for AID relations with the military, among its various tasks.51
Finally, within the U.S. Government, various agencies with interests abroad perform political warfarelike functions. While these agencies pursue their agency responsibilities abroad, they serve in each country
at the behest of the chief of mission, who ostensibly
retains overall authority for all official U.S. Government activities within the country.52 Organizations
such as the Peace Corps have long had interests in
sending volunteers abroad to assist targeted countries—for example, in Kenya where key areas include
economic and small business development, education,
and public health; and in South Africa, where volunteers provide advice on computer use and technology,
classroom management, and English, math, and science lesson plan development.53 The Peace Corps can
be considered a political warfare organization. Similarly, the various agencies within the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC) also maintain a strong international
presence, though not directly related to political warfare.54 Other U.S. agencies, such as the Departments of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Justice
play specialized political warfare in terms of development and health projects, as well as the training of
foreign security forces.55 Most recently, the 2003 establishment of the Department of Homeland Security created a large bureaucratic organization with interests
abroad. Again, however, this organization only plays
an indirect role in political warfare operations vis-à-vis
the U.S. military and AID.
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Outside of the U.S. Government, several U.S. nongovernment organizatiions (NGOs) conduct political
warfare operations in Africa. NGO missions range
from emergency relief services that assist people afflicted by conflict or disaster to sustainable community
development projects that integrate agriculture, health,
housing and infrastructure, economic development,
education and environment, and local management.
While some are faith-based organizations, U.S. NGOs
receive funding from public and private donations and
grants—including funds from the U.S. Government.
Thus, NGOs warrant mentioning in this examination
of U.S. political warfare capabilities in Africa.
Founded in 1970, Africare is a leading U.S. NGO that
provides aid to Africa; it also is one of the oldest and
largest African-American organizations specializing in
African aid. A pioneer in village-based rural development in Africa, Africare’s programs address needs in
the principal areas of food security and agriculture, as
well as health and HIV/AIDS. Africare also supports
water resource development, environmental management, basic education, microenterprise development,
governance initiatives, and emergency humanitarian
aid. Africare’s five principal areas—food, water, the
environment, health, and emergency humanitarian
aid—fall under the rubric of political warfare operations.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was founded in 1943
by the Catholic Bishops of the United States to assist
the poor and disadvantaged outside the United States.
While policies and programs of the agency reflect and
express the teaching of the Catholic Church, CRS assists persons ostensibly on the basis of need, not creed,
race, or nationality. Some of CRS’s programs that can
be considered political warfare involve agriculture,
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HIV/AIDS, community health, education, and emergency response. An example of CRS operations occurred after violence erupted in the northern Nigerian
city of Kano. In 2004, CRS responded to the violence by
providing affected families with basic nonfood items
that were lost or destroyed during the crisis, as well
as food distributions to help cover the anticipated 2month hunger period.56
Another U.S. NGO is Mercy Corps. Founded in
1979, Mercy Corps was among the first humanitarian groups to use relief and development programs to
strengthen civil society. In Africa, Mercy Corps is working with agro-pastoralists in the West Hararge Zone of
Ethiopia to support recovery from drought and foster
ways to minimize the effects of future crises. The West
Hararge Livestock Program will benefit 75,000 people
by vaccinating over 200,000 head of cattle and camels
against several livestock diseases.57 The program will
also establish a plant nursery to grow improved stocks
of forage for livestock and provide two new veterinary clinics to develop better preventative animal care.
Mercy Corps is known nationally and internationally
for its quick-response, high-impact programs.
The U.S. Government and NGOs have operated on
the African continent for centuries. Between the late
18th and early 19th centuries, the United States was
embroiled in a conflict with Barbary pirates and North
African authorities, which led to the establishment
of the U.S. Navy and the freedom of seas principle.58
Throughout the 19th century, the American Colonization Society sent free African-Americans to Africa as
an alternative to emancipation in the United States.
The society established a colony in West Africa in 1822;
this colony became the independent nation of Liberia
in 1847.59 Nevertheless, Robert Kaplan has asserted,
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“Despite what African rulers say, the lack of an imperial tradition in the United States has hindered, rather
than helped, its ability to be a force for positive change
in Africa.”60 In contrast, however, a nation with an imperial tradition that is operating in Africa today is the
PRC, whose ties to the African continent date back as
early as the 15th century.61
The PRC in Africa: History and Objectives.62
The People’s Republic of China became engaged in
Africa issues as early as 1955.63 At the Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian solidarity, delegates from Egypt
introduced the PRC to the independence struggle in
French Algeria.64 From that point forward, the PRC
provided support for Algerian independence and
used Cairo as a central node from which to conduct
operations around the continent.65 From the very beginning, Beijing’s operations were multifaceted, from
“friendship” tours to economic assistance to weapons
transfers. The PRC’s relations with Africa were always
more than support for revolutionary movements and
more than an ideological struggle with Soviet Union.66
Throughout this period, Beijing’s relations with Africa
were based on the central objective of its grand strategy. And its central objective in Africa was part and
parcel of its central objective globally. Examining past
statements and analyses reveals the continuity of the
PRC’s central objective.67
Chairman Mao Tse-tung delivered a speech at the
Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that
stated in plain terms the central objective of the forthcoming People’s Republic; though pronounced over
a half-century ago, this statement encapsulates accu-
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rately the central objective of the PRC’s current grand
strategy. On June 15, 1949, Mao said, “We will build
up an entirely new, strong, and prosperous People’s
Democratic Republic of China, not only in name but in
fact.”68 This was a clear statement of Beijing’s central,
grand strategic objective. Eleven years later, Sinologist
Howard L. Boorman assessed the PRC’s central objective along similar lines: “Internationally, revitalized
Chinese national power, under Communist control,
has signaled Peking’s primary foreign-policy goal:
recognized status as a major world power on its own
terms.”69 Boorman’s analysis was later echoed in the
mainstream media: “China’s long-run objective is to
become the most important power on this planet to
correspond with the fact that it has the largest population of any nation.”70 While these words may seem
dated, the PRC’s central aims remain the same.
Since the mid-1980s, Chinese security analysts
have debated the future security environment and
their country’s role within it.71 This has had an indirect
bearing on Beijing’s central objective. One of the major
themes that emerged was a trend toward a multipolar world after a period of turbulence and transition.
The PRC, it has been debated, will emerge as one of
the poles.72 This view of the world reaffirms previous
analyses that the PRC desires to become a major world
power “on its own terms.” Beijing’s 1998 National Defense white paper was even more explicit in identifying its central objective. “Mankind is about to enter
the 21st century of its history. It is the aspiration of the
Chinese government and people to lead a peaceful,
stable and prosperous world into the new century.”73
Beijing released a White Paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development Road in December 2005. In it, the PRC
identified its goal for the first 20 years of the century:
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“to build a moderately well-off society in an all-round
way that benefits over one billion people, further develop China’s economy, improve democracy, advance
science and education, enrich culture, foster greater social harmony and upgrade the quality of life of the Chinese people.”74 A month later, Beijing released its first
official government paper on its policy toward Africa.
The paper stated, “China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of
peace.”75 The goal of building a “moderately well-off
society in an all-round way” and the “independent”
foreign policy being pursued by the PRC today have
the same central objective as enunciated by Mao in
1949—to achieve great power status.
The central aim of the PRC’s grand strategy is to become a global power, restructuring the world order—
including the African continent—to achieve this objective. It seeks to wield the influence of a global power,
receiving the concomitant favors and privileges associated therewith—including freedom of action, access
to natural resources, and respected authority around
the world. While other interests—including diminishing Taiwan’s diplomatic presence worldwide as well
as seeking greater access to raw materials and energy
resources worldwide—no doubt play some role in the
PRC’s grand strategy, they are too often overemphasized at the expense of recognizing Beijing’s primary
objective of becoming a global power.76 Furthermore,
these secondary interests—some of the favors and
privileges associated with being a global power—may
be subsumed under the PRC’s primary objective. Understanding its central objective and viewing its operations in a grand strategic context, therefore, Beijing’s
recent operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and
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South Africa demonstrate continuity with past objectives—not a renewed or drastically divergent focus on
the continent—and a continuation of the use of political warfare as an essential instrument of grand strategy. How successful has the PRC been in achieving its
central objective? We begin by examining PRC political warfare operations in two Horn of Africa countries.
Each case highlights PRC political warfare operations,
followed by discussions of PRC gains in each country.
In-Roads: PRC Political Warfare Operations
in Ethiopia.
The PRC established diplomatic relations with
Ethiopia in 1970. Cultural contact between the two
countries, however, predated the formal establishment
of diplomatic relations when an Ethiopian music and
dance group first visited Beijing in 1960.77 Bilateral relations between the two countries were limited until
the mid-1990s. Reciprocal high-level visits by Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi and President Jiang Zemin occurred in 1995 and 1996. This led to a series of agreements between the two countries, including the PRC
provision of free assistance to Ethiopia for a period of 5
years (June 1, 1996, to May 31, 2001). Agreements also
encouraged the establishment of cooperation projects
and service centers in order to facilitate the development of trade, economic and technical cooperation,
and exchanges between the two countries; advocated
exchanging and training necessary technical personnel
to implement the agreed upon cooperation projects;
and promoted holding exhibitions and fairs in each
country.78 Using this comprehensive agreement as a
springboard, the PRC used political warfare to gain access to and influence Ethiopia.
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In December 1999, the PRC donated $100,000 to
the Organization of African Unity (OAU, predecessor to the African Union) peace fund. PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia Jiang Zhenyun recalled that Beijing
had always admired Africa’s efforts in their liberation
struggles and pledged his country’s full support to
the OAU’s endeavors to solve African problems with
Africans themselves.79 Similarly, the PRC donated another $200,000 to the OAU peace fund in April 2000.
Ambassador to Ethiopia Jiang handed over the money
to OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim in Addis Ababa, saying his government attached great importance to the role of the OAU in maintaining peace
and stability on the continent.80 By providing the OAU,
headquartered in Ethiopia, free funds, the PRC demonstrated a commitment to peace and security in Ethiopia and, more broadly, in Africa as a whole. Next, the
PRC turned directly to the Ethiopian government and
people.
In April 2000, the PRC donated $200,000 to Ethiopia to support the country’s effort to save millions of
people facing starvation due to prolonged drought.
Ambassador to Ethiopia Jiang stressed that the donation reflected “the goodwill of the Chinese people
towards the Ethiopian people.”81 In October 2000, the
PRC donated office equipment worth $24,000 to the
Ethiopian Ministry of Information and Culture on the
eve of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The office
equipment included computers, printers, and television sets. This PRC donation was the fourth of its kind
to the Ethiopian Ministry of Information and Culture.82
Beijing, by providing free financial contributions at opportune times, used political warfare to demonstrate
Chinese support for the Ethiopian people and possibly
gain benefits in the future.
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In October 2000, a low-cost housing project, aided
by the PRC government and completed by Chinese
constructor workers, was delivered to the Addis Ababa city government. The project, with the first phase
consisting of five blocks, was implemented under the
grant of the Chinese government in accordance with
the Exchange of Letters signed by the governments
of China and Ethiopia in October 1997. The houses,
which could accommodate a total of 85 families, went
into construction in June 1999 and were completed in
August 2000.83 Using government funds and a stateowned construction firm, this was a tangible example
of PRC support to the people of Addis Ababa. Yet the
PRC continued to use political warfare to gain a favorable impression.
In December 2001, the PRC donated demining
equipment worth more than $100,000 to the Ethiopian
government. The donation of the equipment was part
of an international demining cooperation program, according to the new PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ai
Ping.84 Two years later, the PRC donated $300,000 to
the newly formed African Union (AU) peace fund.
Ambassador to Ethiopia Ai made the donation, while
the chairperson of the AU Commission, Professor Alpha Omar Konaré, expressed appreciation to the PRC
for the financial gesture that demonstrated “the strong
partnership and mutual friendship existing between
China and Africa.”85 Beijing used a combination of financial contributions to the Ethiopian government and
the AU as political warfare. While the contributions
were not particularly large, they demonstrated Beijing’s support. These types of ploys would continue.
In April 2005, the PRC donated $400,000 to the AU
in support of its peace efforts. Making the donation on
behalf of his government, PRC Assistant Minister of
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Foreign Affairs Lu Guezeng said the donation was to
support the African Union’s peace efforts, particularly in Darfur, Western Sudan. Receiving the donation,
Chairperson of the AU Commission Konaré expressed
appreciation to the PRC for its continuous support,
indicating that the donation was yet another demonstration of China’s determination to assist the AU in
resolving conflicts on the continent.86 While the financial donations were not sizeable, they showed the PRC
willingness to assist the African people achieve peace
and security.
The PRC also used its own people and culture as
forms of political warfare. For example, a three-man
delegation from the Ethiopian Ministry of Education
visited the PRC in December 2005. Ethiopian Education Minister Dr. Sintayehu Wolde-Michael told a
press conference that Chinese teachers would arrive in
Ethiopia to share their experiences in various fields of
study.87 The next month, speaking at an exhibition of
pictures of Beijing and the art of Weifang Kites from the
PRC, the new PRC ambassador to Ethiopia, Lin Ling,
said the bilateral relations and understanding between
the peoples of China and Ethiopia was consolidating
on the basis of mutual respect and benefit. Ethiopian
State Minister of Culture and Tourism Mohammad
Ahmed Ga’as said cultural exchanges between the two
countries were of immense significance in consolidating relations of the peoples and governments of the
two countries, which he said shared similar ancient
civilization, history, and culture.88 By sending Chinese
teachers and exhibiting Chinese culture, the PRC attempted to influence the Ethiopian people directly.
PRC political warfare operations resulted in tangible benefits as well. In December 2003, the GoteraWollo Areas Road Project, located south of Addis Aba-
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ba, was inaugurated by high-ranking Ethiopian and
Chinese officials. The 2.2 kilometer road, named the
“Ethio-China Friendship Avenue,” was completed in
80 days at the cost of 30 million birr. The cost was covered by the PRC. Inaugurating the avenue, Ato Arkebe
Uqubay, the mayor of Addis Ababa, said the avenue
reflected the ever growing bonds of friendship between
China and Ethiopia. PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhao
Xing, who attended the inauguration ceremony, said
“Being proud of the ever increasing co-operation, we
would work for more partnership and mutual trust.”89
The PRC and Ethiopia also signed a memorandum of
understanding on cooperation in water resources development in May 2004. The memorandum, signed by
visiting PRC Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng
and Ethiopian Minister for Water Resources Development Shiferraw Jarso, expanded existing Sino-Ethiopia
cooperation in utilization, management, and sustainable development of water resources and established
a long-term cooperative relationship. In line with the
memorandum, the PRC would provide various support, including capacity building in the areas of rural
water supply, irrigation development, hydro-power
generation, and water resources management, as well
as technological transfer and training of manpower.90
These are examples of the PRC paving roads and attaining water for the Ethiopian people, conducting operations that directly affected Ethiopians’ lives. Since
late 1999, these examples of PRC political warfare led
to fruitful opportunities at the grand strategic level in
Ethiopia.
Military-to-military relations were an important
fruit of PRC operations. In November 2002, PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian met with Ethiopian Defense Minister Abadula Gemeda to further strengthen
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military cooperation and contribute to transforming
the capacity of the Ethiopian army to a better standard. Noting that consolidation of military-to-military relations was one way to further strengthen the
growing relationship between his country and Ethiopia, Defense Minister Chi, who was also vice chairman
of the Central Military Commission, said his meeting
with Gemeda focused on military cooperation.91 PRC
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang, who was interviewed later that month, declined to reveal the type
of military assistance the PRC was providing to Ethiopia, although he insisted it would help them improve
their defense capacity and make their countries more
secure.92 In another example from August 2005, Prime
Minister Zenawi Meles told a visiting PRC military
delegation led by the commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Lieutenant General Zhu Wenquan, that
Ethiopia wanted mutual cooperation in military training, technology, and peacekeeping expertise. Wenquan
said strengthening bilateral ties between Ethiopia and
China “will contribute a lot toward ensuring peace and
stability at a global level.”93 An official from the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense, who attended the talks, said
Ethiopia and China had long-standing cooperation in
military training.94 PRC political warfare operations allowed such grand strategic relations to flourish.
Political warfare operations have helped the PRC
achieve the central objective of its grand strategy in
Ethiopia.95 This case highlights how the PRC used political warfare to gain access to and develop opportunities in Ethiopia. Using donations to the Ethiopian government and people as well as to the OAU and, later,
the AU, Beijing attained government contracts, signed
agreements, and cultivated bilateral relations.
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Steady Growth: PRC Political Warfare Operations
in Kenya.
After Kenya gained independence, the PRC established diplomatic relations with the new nation-state
on December 14, 1963. Leading up to the end of the
20th century, the two countries already maintained
close relations. For example, in August 1991, on a visit
to the PRC, Kenyan Foreign Minister Wilson Ndolo
Ayah met with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and
agreed to increase the number of technical scholarships to Kenya.96 General Lieu Jingsong, commander
of the Lanzhou Military Zone, headed the first Chinese
military delegation to visit Kenya in December 1996.
Two Kenyan military delegations visited the PRC in
1997. One was led by then Chief of General Staff General Daudi Tonje, and the other by the then Kenya Air
Force commander, General Nick Leshan.97 In April
1997, Kenya received a batch of six 17-seat Y-12 aircraft manufactured by Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing
Corporation.98
PRC political warfare operations had already resulted in tangible gains. The China Road and Bridge
Corporation (CRBC) was involved in a massive irrigation project underway in Kenya’s Tana River
Delta. Also, CRBC was working on over $100 million
worth of ongoing projects, including 200 kilometers of
coastal road and 150 kilometers of Kenya’s most important transport route, the A-109 road from the port
of Mombasa to the capital, Nairobi. Based in Nairobi
since 1984, CRBC was controlled entirely through the
PRC Ministry of Communication.99 In December 1999,
the PRC provided Kenya a $6 million interest-free loan
earmarked for a road project. Visiting PRC Assistant
Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
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Xu Bingjin and Kenyan Finance Minister Christanus
Okemo signed the agreement in Nairobi. The loan was
used to build a 54-kilometer section of road in Kenya100
Despite its past successes, the PRC continued to use
political warfare to further its interests in Kenya.
Twelve performers from the Tianjin Acrobatic
Troupe of China “conquered” Kenyans with their exquisite acrobatic performances from September 18 to
October 2, 2000. They presented Kenyans with a range of
acrobatic programs like the juggling of umbrellas with
their feet and spinning small red carpets on their toes.
The PRC performers gave a total of 14 performances,
attracting an audience of 100,000 during a half-month
tour of Kenya. The troupe not only acted as envoys of
Chinese culture but also helped raise about $30,000 for
nearly 3.3 million Kenyan people in drought-stricken
areas.101 To help solve the power shortage in rural areas, the PRC donated $160,000 to implement a pilot
solar energy program for Kenya in November 2000.
The project came at a time when power rationing was
wide-spread in Kenya due to the severe drought; it also
provided a source of new, clean energy in a country
heavily dependent on hydropower.102 Using a combination of cultural performance, fund-raising, and solar
power, Beijing attempted to influence Kenyan public
opinion.
In May 2001, China Central Television (CCTV),
Beijing’s national television station, agreed to authorize Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) to use
programs from CCTV’s Channel 4 and 9, both for international services. According to the Kenyan minister for information, transport and communication, this
broadcasting cooperation enabled Kenya to have more
news sources instead of concentrating on Western media.103 In addition, the two countries signed a docu-
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ment for CCTV to donate to KBC a set of equipment to
receive satellite signals from CCTV. The PRC director
of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, who led the visiting delegation, noted that radio
and television were crucial in mass mobilization and
expressed the hope that bilateral relations between
both countries would be boosted through the technical
cooperation.104 In June 2001, the $60,000-donated set
of equipment to receive satellite signals was fixed and
put into operation by KBC.105 In July 2001, the Kenyan
minister for tourism and information and the president of Xinhua News Agency signed an agreement
under which Xinhua donated equipment—including
computers, printers, and a fax machine—to the Kenya News Agency.106 CCTV later donated additional
TV equipment worth approximately $154,200 to KBC.
The equipment included a nonlinear editing system, a
digital video recorder, and a monitor.107 China Radio
International (CRI), Beijing’s sole operating overseas
radio station service, launched an FM radio service in
Nairobi in January 2006. The FM radio station, known
as Africa Express, began providing 19 hours of CRI programs a day in English, Swahili, and Chinese to the estimated 2 million residents in Nairobi.108 PRC political
warfare operations used information to influence the
Kenyan people.
Beijing’s operations targeted various sectors of the
Kenyan populace. The All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU), for example, donated a batch of computers to its Kenyan counterpart to help the latter improve its capacity in information technology in January
2003. The computers were handed over to the Central
Organization of Trade Unions of Kenya (COTU) at its
headquarters by Counsellor Guan Ruoxun of the PRC
embassy to Kenya. The computers would be used to
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launch a computer training center at the Tom Mboya
Labor College in Kenya’s western city of Kisumu to
train labor movement personnel.109 The following
month, Beijing donated 32 military vehicles to the Kenyan military. Valued at approximately $1.2 million, the
32 vehicles included 12 buses, 12 mini buses, and eight
ambulances. PRC Ambassador to Kenya Du said during the handover ceremony, “What we are seeing here
today is true testimony of the cordial relations that has
been in existence for the last 40 years since the two
countries established diplomatic ties.”110 By the end of
2003, the PRC was expected to deliver an additional 26
vehicles to the Kenyan military.111 The PRC also provided the Kenyan military with 103 vehicles at the end
of 2000.112
In February 2003, the PRC donated agricultural
machinery worth approximately $64,900 to help Kenya in its agricultural development. The equipment
included eight walking tractors, 20 diesel engines, and
20 maize crushers. During the handover ceremony
with PRC Ambassador to Kenya Du, Kenyan Deputy
Agricultural Minister Joseph Munyao said, “Kenya
can no longer continue depending mostly on the west
for mechanization technologies.”113 The explicit prejudice against the West was significant. The following
month, the China Red Cross Society, through the PRC
embassy in Kenya, donated relief goods worth $10,000
to Kenyan flood victims. Purchased locally, notably,
the donations included blankets, mosquito nets, soap,
and other necessities. Zhongxing Telecommunication
Equipment Corporation, a major PRC telecommunication company operating in Kenya, also donated relief
goods worth $5,000.114 Through these actions, the PRC
demonstrated concern with the health and well-being
of the Kenyan people.
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The PRC also focused operations on the provision
of medical supplies. The PRC donated $23,219 worth
of medical equipment and contraceptives to Kenya
in August 2003. The donation included an ultrasonic
machine, a digital video imaging machine, and an infrared therapy machine. PRC Ambassador to Kenya
Guo Chongli, on behalf of the State Family Planning
Commission of China, donated the equipment and
contraceptives to Kenyan Minister for Planning and
National Development Peter Nyongo.115 The following
month, the PRC donated $50,000 worth of anti-malaria
drugs to Kenya.116 In November 2002, the PRC donated
100,000 bottles of an anti-tuberculosis drug to Kenya to
help fight the disease. The $900,000 of pasiniazide was
donated by the PRC ambassador to Kenya on behalf of
the China Society for Promoting Guangcai Program, a
Chinese entrepreneurial NGO in the private sector, to
the Kenyan Ministry of Health.117
To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Kenyan diplomatic relations, the PRC
embassy in Kenya and the Kenyan Ministry of Gender,
Sports, Culture, and Social Services sponsored an 8day photograph exhibition entitled “Beautiful China”
in December 2003. The exhibition recorded various aspects of the PRC, serving as a guide “to explore a very
diversified country.”118 The Kenyan National Assembly also called for closer parliamentary cooperation
with the PRC National People’s Congress (NPC). Celebrating the 40th anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic ties, the NPC also granted $48,000 worth of
office equipment to the Kenyan parliament.119 The following month, the PRC Ministry of Education, through
the PRC embassy in Kenya, donated books and audiovideo materials to the Egerton University, one of the
leading public universities in Kenya. Focused mainly
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on Chinese language teaching, the books and materials
included cassettes, video tapes, and CD-ROMs.120
PRC political warfare operations continually targeted the Kenyan people. In August 2004, the PRC donated 60,000 kg of maize worth $20,000 to help flood
victims in Budalangi in western Kenya. Emphasizing
long-term measures, the PRC also offered to help Kenya develop water conservation facilities to enable the
country to harvest and store rain water for use during
the dry spells.121 That same month, the PRC pledged a
total of KSh 4.8 billion to upgrade the distribution of
Kenya’s electrical industry.122 The All-China Youth Federation donated $25,000 worth of office equipment—including 40 computers—to the Kenya Youth Service in
September 2004. Speaking at the handover ceremony,
PRC Ambassador to Kenya Guo Chongli said, “They
are not only a gift from All-China Youth Federation to
Kenya Youth Service, but also a symbol of friendship
that millions of Chinese young people cherish toward
their Kenyan peers.”123 Also in September, Roads and
Public Works Minister Raila Odinga announced that
the PRC would build a road network around Lake Victoria. The roads were expected to greatly boost fishing
and other activities in the region.124
In response to the January 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, Beijing provided the Kenya government with a
donation of $100,000 in support of its disaster relief efforts. The tsunami killed one Kenyan, damaged over
200 fishing boats, and caused more than 12,000 lost
jobs along Kenya’s coastline.125 Later that month, the
PRC donated an additional $1.31 million in relief materials to Kenya as a result of the tsunami. The relief
materials included tents, power generators, medicines,
food, and daily necessities.126
Political warfare operations gave Beijing influence
in Kenya’s education system. For example, a 5-year
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bilateral agreement between the two countries aimed
at boosting manpower development in the country. In
July 2003, PRC Ambassador to Kenya Guo Chongli said
selected universities would receive assistance under an
agreement. Assistance would go towards upgrading
facilities at universities, improving research capacity,
and creating direct linkages between local and state
funded universities in the PRC.127 Ambassador Guo
made his remarks during a send off ceremony for nine
Kenyan students on PRC scholarships. According to
Kenyan Senior Deputy Director of Education Gilbert
Lengoibone, the PRC provided scholarships to about
30 Kenyan students annually.128
Furthermore, the PRC and Kenya signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2004 regarding university-level Chinese language instruction in Kenya.
The University of Nairobi and Egerton University
would establish a “Confucius Unit” offering Chinese
language courses. PRC Minister of Education Zhou Ji
said China would post lecturers to the two universities
in addition to providing facilities and teaching materials.129 Less than 2 years later, the PRC opened its first
Confucius Institute in Nairobi. Designated by the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) and planned by Tianjin Normal University, the Institute was designed to popularize the
teaching and learning of Chinese language and culture
worldwide.130
PRC political warfare operations also affected infrastructure construction in Kenya. For example, the PRC
spent approximately $3.8 million in July 2004 to renovate and equip Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi,
the country’s largest referral hospital. The economic
and commercial counsellor of the PRC embassy in Kenya, Ju Sichuan, also said the PRC would fund the con-
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struction of the Serem-Shamakhokho road in western
Kenya for $19 million and a maize processing mill in
Bomet in the Rift Valley Province for $76,000.131 In January 2006, it was announced that the PRC would finance
construction of two high voltage power lines in Kenya
at a cost of $19 million. Constructing the lines, China
CAMMC Engineering Company would establish lines
from Chemosit in Kericho to Kisii and from Kamburu
to Meru.132 By using political warfare, the PRC was active throughout Kenyan society.
PRC operations affected the political and military
establishment in Kenya as well. Kenya’s parliament and
government voiced support for Beijing’s anti-secession
law in March 2005. “Kenya, as a friend of China, has
always supported the one-China policy and will never
support Taiwan’s secession from China,” said Speaker
of the National Assembly of Kenya Francis Ole Kaparo.133 The PRC and Kenya held military discussions regarding the possible purchase of military hardware for
the Kenyan DoD in the summer 2005. The deal for PRC
military vehicles included troop-carrying vehicles and
armored personnel carriers.134 A PRC military delegation visited the country in June for talks with Kenya’s
DoD. The PRC team, led by Vice Minister for Logistical Affairs Lieutenant General Wang Xian, was in the
country for 5 days.
The PRC used political warfare to move relations
with Kenya to a higher level. Prior to 2000, Beijing already had access to Kenya, from military relations to
water and road projects. Its operations since 2000, however, expanded the PRC’s reach into the information,
education, and infrastructure development areas of
Kenya. Unlike its operations in neighboring Ethiopia,
the PRC focused on furthering its already close relations with Kenya through the use of political warfare.
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East to West: PRC Political Warfare Operations
in Nigeria.
Diplomatic relations between the PRC and Nigeria were established in 1971. Trade and interaction
between the two countries, however, dated back to
1960.135 Bilateral relations grew leading up to the 20th
century. In October 1989, for example, Nigeria’s chief
of army staff made a 10-day official visit to France and
China to explore military cooperation.136 PRC Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei visited four West African
nations, including Nigeria, in the summer of 1994. PRC
agreed to assist in socio-economics and political stability; Nigeria, along with the three other West African
nations, agreed to support the PRC on the “one China”
policy.137 Three years later, Premier Li Peng visited Africa for 2 weeks. Visiting Nigeria, Premier Li placed
emphasis on the positive, long-standing relationship
between the PRC and Africa.138 Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo even visited the PRC in 1999. The
PRC, however, did not have significant political, economic, or military access to Nigeria; its political warfare operations would change this.
As with the Horn of Africa countries, a focus of
PRC political warfare was the health and well-being of
the Nigerian people. For example, a well-known PRC
pharmaceutical company donated $50,000 worth of
anti-malaria drugs to Nigeria in May 2000. Etim Oyosoro, Managing Director of Churchbells Pharmaceuticals Ltd, the marketing agency for Cotecxin drugs in
Nigeria, presented the drugs to the Minister of Health
Tim Menakaya. Beijing’s COTEC New Technology
Corporation produced and donated the anti-malaria
drug Cotecxin to Nigeria.139 The PRC also donated 300
medicine-treated mosquito nets to Nigeria to mark the
African Malaria Day. The PRC provided Nigeria with
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approximately $3.5 million free aid, which was reportedly to be used to buy medicine-treated bed nets and
other malaria drugs.140 In December 2000, the PRC and
Nigeria agreed to establish a tropical infections disease
center to promote Chinese techniques of infectious disease diagnosis in Nigeria. The center would also train
Nigerians in the application of diagnoses in China, notably, and provide Nigeria free amounts of diagnostic
reagents and equipment.141 The PRC donated additional drugs for malaria control worth approximately
$2.4 million to Nigeria in May 2003. The drugs donated
included cartons of malaria drug Cotecxin, bales containing child-size mosquito nets, and bales of familysize mosquito nets. The donation also included insecticide for treatment of the nets.142
Typical of its operations, the PRC exploited the local
situation in Nigeria. In February 2002, the PRC donated emergency relief assistance to Nigeria after a blast
at a military armory in Lagos. Vice Mayor of Shanghai Zhou Muyao indicated the PRC pledged the sum
of $120,000 to Nigeria to alleviate the sufferings of the
victims. He said even though this amount was small,
it was a symbolic gesture to show that both countries
feel concern for each other.143 Later the year, the PRC
donated $120,000 worth of relief supplies to the victims of the January 27 bomb blast in Lagos. Donated on
behalf of the PRC by its ambassador to Nigeria, Liang
Yinzhu, the items included blankets, wax print, and
towels. The ambassador explained that the donation
was in recognition of the cordial relationship between
China and Nigeria and pledged the continued cooperation of the governments and peoples of both countries.144
PRC political warfare operations were also directed toward the Nigerian government. In May 2000, the
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PRC Ministry of Science and Technology donated 40
computers and 21 laser printers to the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology of Nigeria. The ministers of science and technology had previously made
reciprocal visits to each other’s countries.145 The original agreement was amended in August to provide two
additional laser printer toners. In December 2001, the
PRC, through its embassy in Nigeria, presented office equipment as cultural aid to the Nigerian Federal
Ministry of Culture and Tourism. PRC Ambassador to
Nigeria Liang Yinzhu said the donation was a gesture
of the PRC government to further cement the good relationship between the two countries. Items presented
to the ministry included computers, printers, fax machines, toner cartridges, and two copy machines.146
The cultural aspect of PRC operations, while not
prominent, was also present. Anniversaries, in particular, were exploited. In October 2001, a 6-day photo
show entitled “Photo Album of the People’s Republic of China (2000-2001)” and the third Nigeria-China
Arts and Crafts International Exhibition were held at
the National Theater in Lagos as part of the activities
to commemorate the 52nd anniversary of the founding
of China. The events were also held to celebrate the
19th anniversary of the signing of the Cultural and Educational Cooperation Agreement between two countries.147 A pictorial exhibition titled “World Heritage in
China” was held in Abuja in December 2001 to mark
“the 30th anniversary of the restoration of China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations.”148
PRC operations also targeted Nigeria’s agricultural
and educational sectors. In September 2003, the PRC
provided Nigeria with a $2.5 million grant. Although
the grant was not tied to any specific projects, it was
believed discussions were aimed at formalizing PRC
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agriculture assistance to Nigeria.149 The following
month, it was reported that Chinese entrepreneurs expressed interest in investing in agricultural industries
in Nigeria’s northwestern state of Kebbi. Chinese entrepreneurs had decided to invest in the development
of rice, onions, and sugar.150 In February 2005, the PRC
embassy in Nigeria donated teaching aids and accessories to the department of languages at Nnamdi Azikwe
University, Awka. Mrs. Tina Okoye, head of the department, announced that the department was set to
begin teaching the Chinese language. Items donated
included a compact disc player, cassettes, books, journals, and magazines.151
Given its influence in the region, Nigeria’s military
was also a focus of PRC operations. The PRC granted
$1 million to Nigeria to upgrade the country’s military
facilities in the summer 2001. Disclosing the grant in
Abuja, PRC Deputy Chief of Defense Staff General Wu
Quanxu said the gesture was part of his country’s contribution to the development of democracy in Nigeria. Heading a high level visiting military delegation,
General Wu said China had much respect for Nigeria
for participating in peace missions and contributing to
sub-regional peace efforts.152 During the announcement
meeting, Chief of Defense Staff Vice-Admiral Ibrahim
Ogohi thanked the PRC delegation for the 30 Nigerian
officers undergoing courses in various Chinese military
institutions, with another 11 to start in September.153 In
September 2004, the PRC donated digital equipment
to the regional intergovernmental body, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) secretariat. PRC Ambassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu presented the equipment in Abuja and said the donation
was “a symbol of China’s interest in the subregion.”154
Valued at $123,000, the items included computers, fax
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machines, copiers, and satellite phones.155 In October
2005, the PRC donated $2 million worth of military
equipment to the Nigerian Armed Forces. A team of
21 Chinese was expected to train Nigerian personnel
in Nigeria in the use of equipment such as computers,
air field sweeper vehicles, emergency navigational and
light vehicles, and deep sea diving equipment. PRC
Ambassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu said the gesture was mainly to facilitate Nigeria’s effort in its various responsibilities that included peacekeeping operations in West Africa.156
The fruits of PRC political warfare operations began on the provincial level. Nigeria’s Gombe State and
China’s Shandong Province agreed to six developmental projects in September 2000. The areas included diesel engine assembly, textiles, real estate, tricycle and
tractor assembly, and the agricultural sector. The governor of Gombe, Abubakar Habu Hashidu, also solicited the assistance of Shandong Province in the areas
of education, water supply, rural development, and
communication.157 In June 2001, the Akwa Ibom State
government and Beijing signed an agreement to build
a refinery and an independent power plant at a cost
of $1.5 billion.158 The Kogi State government signed a
$60 million loan agreement with the PRC government
for the establishment of a sugar factory in the state in
April 2004. The state governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Idris,
who disclosed this on his return from an economic trip
to the PRC, said the loan package also covered the provision of water schemes as well as the establishment of
vocational centers for training unemployed youths.159
In the agricultural sector, the PRC made considerable gains. Nigeria and the PRC agreed to embark on
a $22.2 million project in the field of agriculture under
the South-South Co-operation Initiative and within the
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framework of a Special Program on Food Security in
October 2002. Areas identified for cooperation included small holder irrigation, production and marketing
of field crops and horticulture, livestock production,
aquaculture, and farm mechanization. The leader of
the PRC delegation, Quan Dieng, further said China
had a considerable comparative advantage and expertise in these areas and would be willing to provide the
necessary experts and field technicians.160 In May 2003,
the first group of PRC agricultural experts arrived in
Nigeria’s northern Kano state to support farming activities under a 4-year program with the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO). The PRC planned to
send 20 experts and at least 500 field technicians with
expertise in various fields of agriculture to spend 3
years in Nigeria. They would work alongside Nigerian
experts in 109 sites all over the country and live in the
farming communities to which they are assigned.161 To
help revitalize Nigeria’s agriculture sector further, the
PRC sent 393 experts in agriculture and related disciplines to provide assistance to farming communities
across the West African country. At a 1-day seminar
entitled “Poverty Alleviation Through Bamboo-based
Development in Agriculture: China Experience,” it was
reported that PRC experts would work directly with
farmers in 109 communities across Nigeria.162 Later in
the year, 496 PRC experts were reported to be in Nigeria assisting in various technical fields such as water
control and fisheries.163
The PRC acquired numerous infrastructure agreements in Nigeria. In March 2002, China Machinery and
Equipment Import and Export Company (CMEC) and
Shandong Power Construction Company agreed to a
$390 million deal with the Nigerian Ministry of Power
and Steel to build two gas-fired power plants with a
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total capacity of 670 megawatts. CMEC President Li
Shuzhi said the plants would help ease the electricity
shortage in Nigeria and promote economic and trade
cooperation between the two countries.164 In March
2005, the PRC agreed to construct 598 boreholes in 18
of the 37 Nigerian states—including the capital, Abuja—to support the country’s water supply program.
The aim of the free-aid water project was to provide
“clean drinkable water to ordinary Nigerians living in
out-of-the-way areas.”165 Nigeria also accepted another
offer from the PRC for the construction and rehabilitation of small and large dams currently slated for the
National Water Supply Program and irrigation.166 In
May, two Chinese companies agreed to provide a $200
million concessionary loan to Nigeria for a rural telecommunications project. It was reported that equipment worth $100 million had been imported, while
project execution had since begun at different levels
in 108 local government headquarters and locations.167
In March 2006, Nigeria and the PRC signed a $2 billion memorandum of understanding to construct fast
rail lines in Nigeria. Signing the memorandum, Nigerian Minister of Commerce Ambassador Idris Waziri
disclosed several areas of future investment including construction of low income housing units, building a cement factory, construction of shopping malls,
and building power stations to boost electricity supply
across the country.168 All of these projects—electricity,
water, telecommunications, rail, and housing—would
directly affect Nigerians’ lives.
PRC operations resulted in strategic successes as
well. In June 2004, Nigerian Minister of Defense Rabiu
Kwankwaso paid a state visit to China. Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan said the military ties between the
two countries had been strengthened and the Chinese
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armed forces attached great importance to the development of military ties with Nigeria.169 On the heels
of Defense Minister Kwankwaso’s visit, a delegation
from the Chinese College of Technology visited Nigeria to explore areas of bilateral cooperation in the
manufacturing of military equipment. Collaboration
between the two countries was aimed at reviving the
activities of the Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON).170 In May 2005, a defense and diplomatic
source told a Nigerian newspaper that a Chinese firm
had signed a deal with the Nigerian Air Force to supply new combat jets. A state-owned PRC consortium,
Aviation Industries of China I (AVIC I), would manufacture and supply the Nigerian Air Force directly with
F-8IIM (FINBACK) combat jets. The number and cost
of the aircraft was still under consideration.171
Nigeria’s defense ministry also signed a contract
worth over $250 million to acquire one squadron of 15
Chengdu F/FT-7NI strike aircraft and training aircraft
from the China National Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation (CATIC) in August 2005. It was
also reported that 12 Nigerian pilots, including four
instructors, would travel to China early 2006 to undergo conversion training on the new aircraft. A related
armaments package accounted for approximately $32
million of the deal’s value, which included the supply
of short-range air-to-air missiles, unguided rockets,
and bombs for anti-tank and runway denial missions.
The reequipment process further involved a deal in excess of $70 million to refurbish five of the Nigerian Air
Force’s stored Alenia G222 transports.172 In early 2006,
Nigerian security sources said the PRC was becoming
one of Nigeria’s main suppliers of military hardware.
They said new supplies of hardware would include
dozens of patrol boats to secure the swamps and creeks
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in the Niger Delta region.173 This was reinforced after
Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar said weapons were coming “from abroad,” namely from Brazil
and China.174 At about the same time, it was further
reported that Nigeria purchased its trainer and fighter
aircraft from Beijing.175
Beijing’s approach to political warfare in Nigeria
was similar to that in the Horn of Africa nations. PRC
operations were diverse and directed at influencing
the people and government of Nigeria, particularly
state governments. Targeting such sectors as agriculture, education, and the military, PRC political warfare
operations affected all aspects of Nigerian society, furthering PRC interests in the country.
Hope on the Cape: PRC Political Warfare
Operations in South Africa.
Unlike the other cases, the PRC did not maintain
formal diplomatic relations with South Africa until
the end of the 20th century. The PRC did, however,
maintain indirect relations with South Africa. For example, in 1991 Beijing imported South African iron ore
for a steel mill in Guangdong province through Hong
Kong.176 The following year, PRC Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen visited West Africa and South Africa.177 In
addition, Nelson Mandela paid an official visit to the
PRC, which began cultivating relations with the African National Congress (ANC).178 In 1996, moreover,
South Africa was reported to be engaged in arms activity with the PRC.179
By 1997, PRC-South Africa trade and investment
contracts were worth $630 million—covering an array
of mineral and metals industries such as diamonds,
copper, cobalt, iron ore, and steel.180 A visiting PRC
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trade mission to South Africa oversaw the signing
of 18 trade and investment contracts worth R 2.6 billion.181 In December 1997, it was also revealed that 40
Chinese scientists and technicians were working illegally in South Africa to dismantle a crucial part of the
country’s nuclear-fuel production capacity and ship it
back to the PRC. South Africa secretly sold Beijing a
high-technology plant for making the zirconium tubing that sheaths the fuel for nuclear reactors in return
for a Chinese-manufactured facility for engineering
titanium.182 Official diplomatic relations were established in January 1998, and PRC-South Africa relations
flourished more openly.
After diplomatic relations were established, the
PRC sent several high level delegations to South Africa. In February 1999, then-PRC Vice President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to South Africa. During the visit,
South Africa and China signed agreements on bilateral
air services; trade, economic, and technical cooperation; and a joint economic and trade commission. In
addition, Beijing made available a grant-in-aid worth
$10 million for low-cost housing; the grant followed
an earlier grant of $25 million for housing and water
projects in South Africa.183 In November 1999, Chairman Li Peng addressed the National Assembly and the
National Council of Provinces and called for a strategic
partnership between Pretoria and Beijing to improve
the lives of the underprivileged and work toward a
new world order.184 The two countries were in the process of negotiations regarding agriculture, customs,
police cooperation, health, development assistance,
and merchant shipping.185 PRC President Jiang Zemin
visited South Africa in April 2000. During the visit, the
PRC signed numerous agreements with South Africa,
including those that dealt with maritime transport,
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animal health and quarantine, police cooperation, arts
and culture, and prevention of tax evasion.186 Two
months later, South African Minister of Defense Mosiuoa Lekota visited the PRC and reportedly said that
South Africa would sell weapons to the PRC after the
country had shown an interest in South African manufactured arms.187 The PRC had apparently expressed
interest in South Africa’s fighter attack helicopter.188
This upward trend in bilateral relations leading into
the 21st century was the context within which the PRC
conducted political warfare in South Africa.
As with the three other anchor states, the PRC used
political warfare to affect the South African people. In
August 2001, the PRC donated medical equipment to
the Ministry of Health to foster better treatment of patients at the national referral hospital, Queen Elizabeth
II. The equipment comsisted of x-ray machines, infant incubation, and dental equipment. The following
spring, the PRC donated 50 wheelchairs to South African disabled pupils in Pretoria “as a token of friendship between the peoples of the two countries.”189
The wheelchairs were donated by the China Disabled
Person’s Federation. The National Council for Persons
with Physical Disabilities in South Africa had hosted
a visit and was invited back to China. The PRC used
political warfare targeted at the health and well-being
of South Africans.
While Chinese had long been present in South Africa, the PRC used cultural operations to influence the
South African people. “Bravo China,” an annual overseas gala staged by China’s top performing artists, was
held in the Nelson Mandela Theater in Johannesburg
in February 2000. The performance was co-sponsored
by CCTV, Shanghai Oriental Television, and Pegasus
International Entertainment.190 In September 2003, two
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rare and endangered Chinese tiger cubs arrived in
Pretoria to be taught survival skills in an exercise to
save the species from extinction. They would undergo
hunting training with the help of South African experts
over the next 5 years before being returned to the PRC.
PRC Ambassador to South Africa Liu Guijin said the
joint project to save these animals marked a new era in
relations between his country and South Africa.191 The
following summer, PRC State Councillor Chen Zhili
headed a governmental delegation to South Africa and
attended the opening ceremony of the “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” in South Africa. The voyage
introduced Chinese culture to Africa and promoted
friendly cooperation in culture and education between
China and African nations.192
Because South Africa was one of the most developed
African nations, the PRC focused on economic opportunities. In November 2003, for example, the South Africa-China Machinery and Electronics Products Fair was
held in Johannesburg to boost trade between the PRC
and South Africa. The first independently held fair included over 150 Chinese companies from 26 provinces
and municipalities in China, exhibiting products such
as construction, engineering, and agricultural machinery; electronic appliances; and communication equipment.193 The PRC embassy in South Africa’s economic
counsellor, Ling Guiru, added that the ultimate goal
of the fair was not only to promote Chinese products
more into South Africa “but more importantly to seek
opportunity to establish cooperation with local counterparts taking advantage of their advanced technology and skills in this field.”194 The PRC used the trade
fair to influence the South African workers.
In terms of military relations, South Africa also
signed a military agreement with China in July 2004
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and donated electronic equipment for use in training
South African military personnel. Defense Minister
Mosiuoa Lekota signed a letter of offer and acceptance
with the PRC Central Military Committee’s second
vice chairman, General Guo Boxiong. The PRC donated 100 computers and 100 laser printers for training
members of the South African National Defense Force
(SANDF).195
PRC political warfare operations resulted in agreements in numerous fields. In May 2002 a PRC delegation led by Vice Minister for Health She Jing—including senior officials of the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine—toured South Africa for
4 days. The two countries agreed to work jointly in
developing herbal medicine and regulating traditional
medicine.196 In September 2002, South Africa and the
PRC signed an agreement for cooperation in communication policy and regulatory framework, technical
standards and certification, radio frequency spectrum,
and management tools. They also agreed to explore
human resources development as well as to share experiences in satellite and other communication networks.197 Furthermore, China and South Africa agreed
to launch technical and scientific cooperation on 10
major projects in March 2003. The two governments
agreed to carry out research and development in such
areas as municipal bridge management information
systems, primary health care telemedicine and traditional Chinese telediagnosis, technologies for restoring
degraded arid and semi-arid rangelands, and copper
mining technology. The PRC also expressed willingness to conduct cooperation and exchanges on the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, mini-satellites, remote
sensing, mining, space, medicine, and health care.198
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The PRC made gains in information cooperation as
well. In July 2004, the two countries signed a letter of
intent to further enhance mutual cooperation and exchanges in the field of media and information. The two
parties agreed to promote communication exchange
via periodicals, books, electronic video, and audio
products as well as exchange and cooperation between
media organizations, including sending journalists to
cover news and holding seminars and workshops with
the participation of media organizations of the two
countries.199 Once again the PRC was targeting the information sector of an African nation.
As in Nigeria, political warfare operations resulted
in successes on the provincial level. The South African and Chinese provinces of North West and Henan
signed a memorandum of understanding to promote
economic and cultural cooperation in August 2004.
The PRC delegation arrived in South Africa to meet the
North West Executive Council and explored possibilities of bilateral relations in arts, culture, tourism, textiles, martial arts, agriculture, and mining industries.200
Also in August, the PRC and South Africa initiated
a poverty alleviation project on waste management
called Phuthanang Community Upliftment. South
African Environmental Affairs and Tourism Deputy
Minister Rejoice Mabudafhasi launched the project in
cooperation with PRC Vice Minister for State Environmental Protection Administration Zheng Xiaodong.
Vice Minister Zheng commented, “I would like to congratulate South Africa on starting a project that starts
with children in primary schools but benefits the community at large. We hope it will be a great success and
a co-operation that will last for a long time to come.”201
PRC operations often targeted African youth.
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PRC operations also facilitated greater military-tomilitary relations. In August 2001 Fu Quanyou, chief
of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army and member of the Central Military Commission, held talks in Beijing with Siphiwe Nyanda, chief
of SANDF. Fu mentioned that military-to-military relations between China and South Africa had developed
smoothly with the frequent exchange of visits between
senior officers.202 For example, China-South Africa Defense Committee meetings were held in April 2003
and June 2005. Meetings strengthened cooperation in
defense and security fields and further promoted cooperation between the two countries and two armed
forces.203 In November 2005, moreover, PRC Defense
Minister Cao Gangchuan met with Deputy Defense
Minister of South Africa Mluleki George “to further
military cooperation and friendly relations with South
Africa in various fields.”204 Cao also briefed the South
African on China’s “domestic construction.”
Given the context, the PRC used political warfare
to achieve somewhat different objectives than in the
other three countries. First, gaining South Africa’s allegiance had the benefit of weakening Taiwan’s global
diplomatic status, which was part and parcel of the
primary objective of Chinese grand strategy. Up until
1997, South Africa was one of the most notable countries in the world still maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This transfer of diplomatic representation was, therefore, a significant accomplishment
of PRC political warfare. While using medical donations and cultural shows to influence the South African
people and government, PRC operations also attained
greater cooperation in technical and scientific fields.
The PRC used the same means—political warfare—to
reach a slightly different end in South Africa. The over-
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all outcome, nevertheless, furthered the central objective of China’s grand strategy.
Conclusion.
PRC political warfare operations followed a similar pattern in all four African countries. But did the
PRC achieve the central objective of its grand strategy?
The PRC had a mission, and it set out to achieve it.205
The PRC sought—and continues to seek—to become a
global power. It seeks to exercise predominant influence over Africa—its governments and people—and
eliminate Western influence. In all four countries, the
PRC demonstrated that it was able to gain access to
and influence the affairs of the African governments,
businesses, and communities using political warfare.
By exerting greater influence in each African country,
Beijing was successful in furthering the central objective of its grand strategy—to become a global power.
Since 2000, the PRC has enhanced its bilateral political, military, and economic relations with the African countries; it has gained further access to natural
resources, particularly in Ethiopia and Nigeria; and it
has received greater respect from the African businesses and communities. Political warfare, one instrument
of grand strategy, was essential to Beijing’s success.
The cases also demonstrate that the PRC intentionally
targeted African countries that were deemed crucial
to U.S. Africa policy, also recognizing their geopolitical importance to influencing the African continent as
whole. Prior to 2000, the PRC was not influential in
the four anchor countries. Today, it exerts influence
in each country and is perceived as a global power by
the local peoples and governments. Political warfare
was crucial to Beijing’s achievement of this position of
prominence.
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One of the PRC’s strengths was its use of a multitude of coordinated operations from many different
angles—using several types of organizations on various targets. Rather than focusing on one segment of
society or a single government agency, the PRC targeted and attempted to influence poor and suffering
Africans as well as rich politicians. (See Figure 1.) The
PRC also benefited from its long-term perspective and
persistent presence in target countries, which allowed
personnel to understand the different African contexts
over time.206 While it may have been hampered by limited resources and outmoded technology, the PRC’s
political warfare operations resulted in tangible benefits for target nations as well as gains for itself.
Ethiopia

OAU/AU peace fund, Ministry of
Information and Culture, City of Addis
Ababa, and Ministry of Education

Kenya

Kenya Broadcast Corporation, Ministry
for Information, Transport, and
Communication, Ministry of Health, and
Kenya Youth Service

Nigeria

Federal Ministry of Science and
Technology, Federal Ministry of Culture
and Tourism, ECOWAS, and Ministry of
Health

South Africa

Ministry of Defense, Council for Persons
with Physical Disabilities in South Africa,
SANDF, and Ministry of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism

Figure 1. Select PRC Political Warfare Targets.
The PRC used a variety of political warfare assets in all four African nations. The PRC used many
nongovernmental but state-run organizations. These
organizations, ostensibly independent of Beijing, performed actions that consistently furthered PRC inter51

ests abroad. Not surprisingly, it relied on active incountry missions as well as governmental organs with
interests abroad. (See Figure 2.) Vis-à-vis the PRC, the
United States possesses many of the same type of governmental political warfare assets in Africa.
Though U.S. Government political warfare capabilities match (and, in some respects, even exceed)
PRC government capabilities, the United States lacks
a coordinated political warfare policy and does not
possess nongovernmental state-run organizations that
are active abroad. In terms of tangible political warfare
operations, the United States is reliant on the military,
which is one of the sole entities of the U.S. Government
currently conducting political warfare. The United
States is sorely deficient in civilian-led political warfare operations. With the military at the forefront of
U.S. political warfare operations, a negative perception
will arise over the long term because the United States
may be viewed as an “occupying” force in foreign
countries—especially across the African continent. The
United States also overlooks the use of gifts to African governments, businesses, and people. Giving and
doing things free of charge furthers U.S. national interests effectively; the PRC has demonstrated this time
and again in Africa. Furthermore, unlike the United
States, the PRC uses many types of venues and themes
to influence target audiences, from trade exhibitions to
cultural performances to educational exchanges. These
gray areas are often overlooked by the U.S. national
security establishment as a means of furthering U.S.
interests abroad.207
The U.S. Army, the DoD, and the national security
establishment must come to a greater appreciation for
what political warfare is, and how it can be used today to defend U.S. interests and allies abroad. Political
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Ethiopia

PRC embassy, Ministry of Water Resources,
Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kenya

China Road and Bridge Corporation, Tianjin
Acrobatic Troupe, China Central Television, All-China
Federation of Trade Unions, and Ministry of Education

Nigeria

COTEC Technology Corporation, City of Shanghai,
Ministry of Science and Technology, Shandong
Province, and CATIC

South Africa China Disabled Person’s Federation, Shanghai
Oriental Television, Ministry for Health, and State
Environmental Protection Administration

Figure 2. Select PRC Political Warfare
Organizations.
warfare is much more than information operations,
what is commonly referred to as propaganda or hearts
and minds campaigns. Political warfare is about influencing governments and people through words
and actions to further the objectives of grand strategy.
People, in foreign countries and in the United States,
react to actions more so than words; this is the heart
of political warfare. The United States is not using its
political warfare capabilities to its fullest potential,
nor does it recognize political warfare as a useful instrument of grand strategy. What passes for political
warfare today in the United States is not recognized as
an instrument of grand strategy. Other countries like
the PRC, meanwhile, use political warfare and recognize its utility in grand strategy. The regular change in
Washington political leadership notwithstanding, the
United States needs to develop and cultivate a longterm grand strategic perspective, taking into account
the crucial role of political warfare. It must maintain
a long-term presence in foreign countries to conduct
political warfare successfully, not only to understand
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foreign cultures but to develop and cultivate personal
relations. This may be done using official U.S. Government agencies but also through nongovernmental U.S.
organizations as well. The U.S. military may be the correct first step to initiate political warfare operations;
but a leading civilian U.S. presence is badly needed to
maintain enduring influence abroad. Instead of viewing missions from a reactive perspective (like “stability” or reconstruction operations), moreover, the DoD
needs to be more proactive in its operational perspective to conduct political warfare successfully. This will
require substantial planning, personnel, and budgeting changes over time to take into account the valuable
role of political warfare. Longer-term programs like the
National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program,
for example, should be encouraged and expanded. Because of its simultaneous three-tiered approach to relationship building (military-military, military-civil, and
civil-civil), the SPP provides a sound basis for future
similar civilian-led programs. In terms of education,
the National Defense University, as well as the armed
services war colleges, should teach grand strategy regularly, including seminars on political warfare. They
should examine British and other Western countries’
uses of political warfare but also non-Western examples, from the PRC to the Russian Federation to India.
The United States is not using political warfare in
a coordinated, effective manner. Changes at the DoD
mean little without civilian leadership at the presidential and congressional levels. Only the President, in coordination with the Congress, can institute the widespread changes needed to create a U.S. grand strategy using political warfare. This will require an unprecedented level of interagency coordination, which
must be created and maintained among the essential
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instruments of grand strategy—especially in the areas of civil-military, governmental-nongovernmental, and U.S.-international relations. A civilian agency
with a global presence like AID—restructured and
revamped—should be mandated to lead U.S. political
warfare efforts. The U.S. Army and other expeditionary components of the DoD should actively seek out
political warfare opportunities—the gray areas—in
support of this lead civilian agency. Additional U.S.
Government participation also is needed from specialized civilian organizations like the Departments of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Justice.
Finally, the U.S. national security establishment needs
to understand that how operations—political warfare,
in particular—are conducted is as important as what
operations are performed. The free wheelchair, given
in the appropriate manner, rolls further than promises
of aid and encouragement of democracy.
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